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Abstract
This paper analyzes educational choices and political support for subsidies to higher
education in the presence of a time-consistency problem in income redistribution. There
may be political support for so generous subsidization that it motivates the median
voter to obtain higher education. As a result of increasing own income, the median
voter prefers in the future lower taxes than without higher education. Therefore,
the expansion of participation in higher education during the second half of the 20th
century may have partly been driven by the aim to limit the political support for overly
generous income redistribution.
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I. Introduction
The second half of the 20th century saw an unprecedented expansion of participation
in higher education around the world. Between 1960 and 2000, the number of tertiary
students per capita increased seven-fold in 15 industrialized Western countries. In Western
democracies, it is nowadays common that more than half of the younger cohorts obtain
higher education. (Schofer and Meyer, 2005) The expansion of the participation in higher
education coincided with a significant increase in the GDP share of the tax burden after the
Second World War. Income transfers increased much more than public sector consumption.
However, the trend towards higher taxes and income redistribution was reversed in most
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Most notably, President Reagan and Prime Minister
Thatcher made reducing tax burden and income redistribution a central part of their policies.
This paper explores the connection between income redistribution and the expansion
of higher education. The starting point of the analysis is the time-consistency problem in
income redistribution, due to political decision-making in the future. After investments in
education have taken place, the median voter has an incentive to impose high taxes. The
paper identifies a strategic policy to counteract the incentive to impose high taxes in the
future: generous subsidies to higher education may encourage the median voter to obtain
higher education. As a result of increasing own income, the median voter prefers in the
future lower taxes than without university education.
Also Konrad (1995) and Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996) have suggested that
governments may subsidize education due to time-consistency problem. Two features dis-
tinguish this paper. First, Konrad (1995) and Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996)
have analyzed optimal subsidies with given government preferences. This paper endogenizes
government preferences through a median voter model, taking into account that also the
productivity of the median voter is endogenous. Second, this paper identifies a possibility
that subsidies are used not only to avoid a downward distortion in investment in higher
education, but may actually be used to create an upward distortion. The motivation for
such an upward distortion resides in alleviating the time-consistency problem of excessive
redistribution by increasing the future income of the median voter.
In a seminal contribution, Meltzer and Richard (1981) showed that a Downsian median
voter model can explain the increase in the size of the public sector in the 19th and 20th
century. Their explanation is that the spread of the franchise increased the number of voters
with relatively low incomes, shifting the position of the decisive voter down the distribution
of income. So, tax rates rose. Meltzer and Richard (1981) analyzed voting with given pro-
ductivities. This paper endogenizes productivities and shows that the median voter model
could explain also the historical expansion in the participation in higher education, in the
presence of time-consistency problem.
The insight given is related to the general idea that current policies can be used to influ-
ence future policies. Glazer (1989) analyzes the choice of durability in public capital projects.
He shows that uncertainty about future voting outcomes generates a bias toward overinvest-
ing in long run projects. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) find that if there is disagreement on
optimal composition of public spending between current and future majorities, the current
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majority may strategically favor a public deficit. This paper finds that all voters may agree
on public expenditures in the first period to change the future incentives of the median voter
in the second, even when the identity of the median voter does not change. Finally, Hassler
et al. (2003) analyze Markov perfect equilibria in repeated voting on distorting income re-
distribution when citizens invest in their education. They find multiple equilibria: In some
equilibria redistribution persists forever, while in others, even a majority of beneficiaries vote
strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period. This paper suggests,
instead, that subsidies to education could be used to limit redistribution relative to GDP, at
the same time increasing total production sufficiently so that the absolute level of transfers
increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model and ana-
lyzes educational choices and voting on income redistribution in the absence of subsidies to
education. Section III shows the main result: with income redistribution, all voters may
agree on subsidies that result in larger investments in higher education than in a laissez-faire
economy. Section IV discusses the effects of the mobility of labor and complementarities in
production, and Section V concludes.
II. The Model
The economy lasts for two periods. There are two types of education, labelled vocational
education and university education. In the first period, young individuals decide which
education to obtain. In the second period, the production of a single consumption good
takes place. The production function is linear in the efficiency units of labor. There exists
a storage technology to move resources over time at a given rate of return, normalized to
zero. For example, in a small open economy the storage technology may take the form
of international capital markets. For simplicity, all consumption takes place in the second
period and utility is linear in consumption. The government collects taxes to redistribute
income in the second period. The length of the second period is one. The length of the first
period corresponds to the duration of either education.
The productivity in case of receiving university education is denoted by variable h, la-
belled ability for simplicity. The individual-specific ability variable follows a continuous
distribution in an interval, h ∈ [0, h]. The density function of h is f(h) and its cumulative
distribution function is F (h). The total population size is normalized to unity. A citizen
who obtains vocational education has productivity v, independently of ability. The cost of
university education is c, while the cost of vocational education is normalized to zero. We
denote the wage rate of individual i by wi, so that wi = v for those with vocational education
and wi = hi for those with university education. The ability threshold at and above which
citizens choose higher education is denoted by h˜. The median ability is denoted by hm.
The government taxes income above an exemption of tax-free income e by a constant
marginal tax rate τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. Tax revenues are used to finance a uniform lump-sum
transfer b. Therefore, the tax and transfer policy is a triple (e, τ , b). Both the marginal
tax rate and the exemption are decided by the median voter at the beginning of the second
period, and the lump-sum transfer is then determined residually from the government budget
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constraint. The efficiency costs of taxation are captured by assuming that a fraction δτ of
the tax revenue that the government could collect without distortions is lost. The value of
δ reflects, for example, various administrative costs and the distortions in economic activity
that are caused by the tax wedge. The multiplicative form δτ captures the idea that the
distortions are increasing in the marginal tax rate. If δ were zero, taxation would not cause
any distortions. When δ > 0, the tax revenue is maximized by the tax ratemin( 1
2δ
, 1). To rule
out 100 percent marginal tax, we assume that δ > 0.5. The government’s (second-period)
budget constraint is
b = τ(1− δτ )
∫ h
h=0
f(h)max(0, w(h)− e)dh, (1)
where w(h) = v for those with vocational education and w(h) = h for those with university
education. The presence of free disposable income is a simple way to capture the possibility
of progressive taxation. It allows the median voter model to replicate the stylized fact that
in most Western countries, the average tax rates increase in income level, even when not
taking into account the effects of income transfers.
Citizens have a double role in the economy. As workers, they choose in the first period
whether to obtain vocational education or university education, taking the expected marginal
wage tax rate, the expected exemption of tax-free income, and the expected lump-sum
transfer as given. As voters, they vote on the exemption and on the marginal wage tax rate
above it in the second period, taking into account how the lump-sum transfer is determined
by the government budget constraint (1).
We solve the equilibrium by backwards induction. In the second period, educational
choices have already been made. The lifetime income as a function of the tax parameters τ ,
e and b and the individual-specific ability hi is
V vi (τ , e, b, hi) = min(e, v) + (1− τ )max(0, v − e) + b (2)
if citizen i chose vocational education in the first period, and
V ui (τ , e, b, hi) = min(e, hi) + (1− τ )max(0, hi − e) + b− c (3)
if citizen i chose university education in the first period. In both (2) and (3), the first term
on the right-hand side reports the tax-exempt earnings, and the second term the above-
exemption after-tax income, if any. The third term is the uniform lump-sum transfer that
citizens take as given when deciding on their education. When voting in the second period,
citizens take into account that b is determined by (1). Finally, the last term on the right-hand
side of (3) captures the cost of university education. Setting τ = e = b = 0, we can solve
from (2) and (3) the laissez-faire cutoff level above which university education is chosen, as
benchmark for future comparisons:
h˜LF = v + c. (4)
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Political decisions are made by direct democracy at the beginning of the second period.
Citizens vote first on the exemption, and then on the marginal wage tax rate, collected
above the exemption. The assumed timing is without loss of generality. The results would
not change if we would assume the opposite timing or simultaneous voting as there is a unique
median voter who is the same in both dimensions. With simultaneous voting, we would solve
for a structure-induced equilibrium, see Shepsle (1979). We denote the equilibrium values
by a hat, so that τ̂(h˜) and ê(h˜) give the political equilibrium marginal wage tax rate and tax
exemption, as a function of the educational choices that are summarized by h˜. The political
equilibria can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 If hm < h˜, ê = v and τ̂ =
1
2δ
. If hm ≥ h˜, ê = hm and τ̂ =
1
2δ
.
Proof. (i) Assume first that hm < h˜, so that the median voter has vocational education.
For any τ > 0, V vi as defined in (2) (inserting (1)) is maximized by choosing e = v. Assume
next that hm ≥ h˜, so that the median voter has university education. For any τ > 0, V
u
i
as defined in (3) (inserting (1)) is maximized by choosing e = hm. This establishes that the
median voter chooses e equal to his or her own income, independently of the marginal tax
rate collected on income above it. (ii) Taking into account that e equals the median voter’s
income, the marginal wage tax rate enters (2) (or (3)) only through its effect on b. By (1)
and taking into account the restriction that δ > 0.5, this is maximized by τ̂ = 1
2δ
.
By Lemma 1, the median voter chooses the tax exemption to equal his or her own income,
and then the marginal tax rate to maximize the tax revenue from any income above that.
We next define the tentative equilibria in the case in which the median voter has obtained
vocational education (labelled Vocational Equilibrium), and in case the median voter has
obtained university education (labelled University Equilibrium):
Definition 1 Vocational Equilibrium is characterized by: h˜ = v + c
1− 1
2δ
> hm, ê = v,
τ̂ = 1
2δ
, b = 1
4δ
∫ h
h=v+ c
1−
1
2δ
f(h)(h− v)dh.
Definition 2 University Equilibrium is characterized by: h˜ = v + c ≤ hm, ê = hm,
τ̂ = 1
2δ
, b = 1
4δ
∫ h
h=hm
f(h)(h− v)dh.
There are no other possible equilibria. The median voter has either vocational education
or university education, and this then determines ê and τ̂ , which in turn determine a unique
value for h˜ by (2) and (3) in either equilibrium. Comparisons with (4) reveal that the
possibility of redistribution does not change educational choices compared with laissez-faire
outcome in the University Equilibrium. In the Vocational Equilibrium, a smaller fraction of
population chooses university education than in the laissez-faire solution. We find:
Proposition 1 (i) If hm < v+c, the only subgame-perfect equilibrium is the Vocational Equi-
librium.
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(ii) If hm > v +
c
1− 1
2δ
, the only subgame-perfect equilibrium is the University Equilibrium.
(iii) If v+c ≤ hm ≤ v+
c
1− 1
2δ
, both the Vocational Equilibrium and the University Equilibrium
are subgame-perfect equilibria.
Proof. In a tentative Vocational (University) Equilibrium, we insert ê and τ̂ from
Definition 1 (Definition 2) into (2) and (3) with hi = hm to verify whether it is individually
optimal for the median voter to make the postulated educational choice in the first period.
When doing this, b is taken to be the same in the two equations as citizens take the lump-
sum transfer as given when making their individual educational choice. (i) If hm < v + c,
the majority of citizens always chooses vocational education. The Vocational Equilibrium
follows by Lemma 1. b given in Definition 1 is found by inserting the parameter values
into (1). (ii) If hm > v +
c
1− 1
2δ
, the Vocational Equilibrium is not subgame-perfect as by
(2) and (3), the median voter would rather deviate in the first period and obtain university
education. The University Equilibrium turns out to be subgame-perfect. b given in Definition
2 is found by inserting the parameter values into (1). (iii) Inserting τ̂ = 1
2δ
, ê = v and
hi = hm into (2) and (3) and comparing, we see that V
v
m(
1
2δ
, v, b, hm) > V
u
m(
1
2δ
, v, b, hm) for
all b. Inserting τ̂ = 1
2δ
, ê = hm and hi = hm into (2) and (3) and comparing, we see that
V um(
1
2δ
, hm, b, hm) > V
v
m(τ , hm, b, hm) for all b. Thus, both equilibria are subgame-perfect.
Proposition 1 shows that if the median voter’s productivity with university education
does not exceed his or her productivity with vocational education at least by the cost of
university education, the only subgame-perfect equilibrium is such that the median voter
chooses vocational education. If, on the other hand, the median voter’s productivity with
university education is sufficiently higher than his or her productivity with vocational ed-
ucation and the marginal wage tax rate is not too high, then the only subgame-perfect
equilibrium is such that the median voter chooses university education. When the median
voter’s productivity in case of obtaining university education falls between these bounds
and the marginal wage tax rate is sufficiently low, there are two subgame-perfect equilibria.
Which one is selected could then depend on expectations.
III. Redistribution and Subsidies to Education
We now introduce the possibility of subsidies to education. Instead of analyzing just
whether subsidies to education could find majority support in voting, we ask whether subsi-
dies to education could receive unanimous support. How the results would differ with voting
is discussed at the end of this section.
Still, there may be several subsidy levels that could find unanimous support when the
alternative is no subsidies, with different ability types preferring different subsidy levels. We
focus on the subsidies to higher education that would be preferred by low-ability citizens,
who choose vocational education.
Subsidies to education need to be financed. In the framework of this paper, labor supply
takes place only in the second period. Thus, it is assumed that the government borrows in
the first period from abroad to finance subsidies to university education, if any, repaying
its debt in the second period. The subsidy is denoted by s, s ≥ 0. The subsidy is paid
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to everyone who obtains university education. The government’s (second-period) budget
constraint is
b = τ(1− δτ)
∫ h
h=0
f(h)max(0, w(e)− e)dh− s(1− F (h˜)). (5)
By (5), subsidies to university education are financed from the same tax revenue as trans-
fers. Thus, also low-ability citizens participate in subsidizing university education. This may
be optimal from their perspective, as they also share part of the returns to university educa-
tion through second-period income redistribution. As subsidies are effectively financed from
lump-sum transfers, those who obtain university education always are in favor of any subsi-
dies that those who obtain vocational education are willing to accept. Therefore, we focus
from now on only on whether low-ability citizens favor subsidies. We solve the equilibrium
with subsidies to university education by backwards induction. In the second period, educa-
tional choices have already been made. The lifetime income as a function of tax parameters
τ , e and b, subsidy parameter s and the individual-specific ability hi is
V vsi (τ , e, b, s, hi) = min(e, v) + (1− τ )max(0, v − e) + b (6)
if citizen i chose vocational education in the first period, and
V usi (τ , e, b, s, hi) = min(e, hi) + (1− τ)max(0, hi − e) + b− c+ s (7)
if citizen i chose university education in the first period. In both (6) and (7), the first term
on the right-hand side reports the tax-exempt earnings, and the second term the above-
exemption after-tax income, if any. The third term is the uniform lump-sum transfer that
citizens take as given when deciding on their education. When voting in the second period,
citizens take into account that b is determined by (5). Finally, the last two terms on the
right-hand side of (7) capture the cost of university education, net of subsidies. We find:
Lemma 2 With any subsidies, it holds that if hm < h˜, ê = v and τ̂ =
1
2δ
, and if hm ≥ h˜,
ê = hm and τ̂ =
1
2δ
.
Proof. Follows as in the proof for Lemma 1, replacing V vi by V
vs
i , V
u
i by V
us
i , (2) by
(6), (3) by (7), and (1) by (5).
To avoid the complications of equilibrium selection with multiple equilibria, we assume
that either hm < v + c or hm > v + c
1− 1
2δ
. This implies that with s = 0, the economy is
for sure either in the Vocational Equilibrium or in the University Equilibrium. In the area
v + c ≤ hm ≤ v + c
1− 1
2δ
there would be two alternative subgame-perfect equilibria without
subsidies. If subsidies could help to coordinate to select the University Equilibrium, this
would be an additional argument in favor of introducing subsidies. We first establish:
Proposition 2 If hm > v+
c
1− 1
2δ
, there is no unanimous support for introducing any subsi-
dies.
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Proof. If hm > v +
c
1− 1
2δ
, the University Equilibrium prevails with zero subsidies. By
Lemma 1, ê = hm. If there would be subsidies to university education, this would lower
h˜. However, as hm = ê by Lemma 2 also with subsidies, those who would obtain education
after subsidies are introduced, but not without subsidies, would have less than tax-exempt
income. By (5), any positive subsidies reduce b and, thus, by (6), lower the utility of those
who obtain vocational education.
By Proposition 2, there is no support for subsidies to university education from the low-
ability citizens if the majority of population would choose university education also without
subsidies. Importantly, subsidies to university education may receive unanimous political
support when the subsidies are so generous that the median voter who would not choose
university education without subsidies chooses university education with subsidies:
Proposition 3 If hm < v+ c, a subsidy at rate s
UE = v− hm + c would generate a Pareto-
improvement, provided that
1
4δ
∫ v+ c
1−
1
2δ
hi=hm
f(h)(h− hm)dh
−
1
4δ
∫ h
hi=v+
c
1−
1
2δ
f(h)(hm − v)dh
−(v − hm + c)(1− F (hm))
> 0 (8)
and that if both the University Equilibrium and the Vocational Equilibrium are subgame-
perfect equilibria with subsidies, the University Equilibrium prevails. Furthermore, citizens
who obtain vocational education strictly prefer sUE to any higher subsidy.
Proof. Proof is given in the Appendix.
While the inequality (8) may appear quite complicated, each term has a clear economic
interpretation. The term on the first line on the left-hand side reports the tax revenue
that could be collected from those who would choose vocational education in the absence of
subsidies, and switch to university education with subsidies. Here, ê = hm and τ̂ =
1
2δ
are
already inserted. The term on the second line reports the lost tax revenue from those who
would have chosen university education even without subsidies. This loss occurs as when
the median voter switches from vocational education to university education, the exemption
increases from v to hm. Finally, the term on the third line is the cost of subsidies at
rate sUE = v − hm + c, multiplied the number of those who choose university education,
(1−F (hm)). Therefore, subsidies win universal support if they increase the total tax revenue
more than they cost.
Proposition 3 establishes that the presence of income redistribution may explain an oth-
erwise puzzlingly large expansion of higher education. With the subsidy rate sUE, h˜ = hm.
Comparing this with (4) and taking into account that hm < v + c when the Proposition 3
applies, we see that the subsidies at the rate sUE result in a larger fraction of population
choosing university education than in the laissez-faire outcome. However, it is not necessar-
ily optimal to choose so generous subsidies that the University Equilibrium is reached, even
when hm < v + c:
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Proposition 4 (i) If hm < v + c and the subsidies are restricted to the interval 0 ≤ s <
v − hm + c, the optimal subsidy from the perspective of low-ability citizens is given by
sV E = arg max
s∈[0,v−hm+c)

 1
4δ
∫ h
h=v+ c−s
1−
1
2δ
f(h)(h− v)dh− (1− F (v +
c− s
1− 1
2δ
))s

 . (9)
(ii) If any non-negative subsidies are allowed, the low-ability citizens prefer either sV E or sUE,
whichever results in a higher lump-sum transfer.
(iii) The cutoff level for university education with sV E, denoted by h˜V E, satisfies h˜V E > h˜LF .
Proof. (i) If hm < v + c and subsidies are restricted to be below s
UE = v − hm + c, the
median voter chooses vocational education. Then ê = v and τ̂ = 1
2δ
by Lemma 2. sV E is
found by inserting these into (5) and maximizing with respect to s. (ii) By Proposition 3,
sUE is optimal for those with vocational education if s ≥ v−hm+ c. By the first part of this
proposition, sV E denotes the optimal subsidy if this is restricted to be below v− hm+ c. As
a result, the choice of the optimal subsidy without any other restriction than non-negativity
boils down to choosing between these two. Depending on the distribution of h, either may
prevail. (iii) In the Vocational Equilibrium, the required subsidy to reach h˜V E = h˜LF would
be c
2δ
. The tax revenue from a citizen with h˜LF would equal 1
4δ
(h˜LF−v) = c
4δ
. Therefore, it is
clearly optimal to lower the subsidy from the perspective of low-ability citizens. This would
increase b through two different channels. First, with given ê and τ̂ , it is not optimal that
someone whose tax payment falls short of the cost of subsidy obtains university education.
(The difference compared with Proposition 3 is that therein, subsidies allowed changing the
educational choice of the median voter. This increased ê and reduced the required level of
subsidy. Therein, cutting the subsidy even marginally would have cancelled the change in
the identity of the median voter, causing a discrete downward jump in the investment in
higher education.) Second, reducing the subsidy so that the previously marginal ability type
no longer obtains education allows savings when also intramarginal ability types receive the
same lower subsidies.
By Proposition 4, the optimal subsidy level can be associated with either inefficiently low
investment in university education, with the median voter choosing vocational education, or
in a larger fraction of population choosing university education than in a laissez-faire econ-
omy. In other words, subsidies are either so modest that the investment in higher education
remains below its laissez-faire level and the majority of population chooses vocational educa-
tion, or so generous that the majority of population obtains university education. Remember
that by Proposition 2, there is no political support for subsidies among low-ability citizens,
in case that the median voter would obtain university education also without subsidies.
This section proved that there can be scope for a unanimous agreement on introducing
subsidies to university education. An alternative would be to assume voting in two stages.
In the first period, there would be voting on subsidies to university education. In the second
period, there would be voting on income redistribution. With such two-stage voting, the
possibility of subsidies may render low-ability citizens worse off in the University Equilibrium
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than if there are no subsidies. The reason is that those who obtain university education could
vote for high subsidies independently of any efficiency considerations, to pass part of the
costs of their education to those who obtain vocational education. Clearly, the possibility of
transferring income from low-ability minority obtaining vocational education to high-ability
majority obtaining university education would widen the scope of ability distributions that
could support the University Equilibrium.
IV. Discussion
The Role of Migration
Towards the end of the 20th century, increased international competition has encouraged
many countries to reduce tax rates on mobile factors of production. There are differing views
on the welfare effects of increased mobility. Justman and Thisse (1997) have raised concern
on inefficiently low public investment in higher education when the educated become mobile,
and Poutvaara (2004) suggests that governments will educate too many students in country-
specific skills, and too few in internationally applicable fields. Wildasin (2000) concludes
that mobility in itself reduces needs for public provision as it provides a market insurance
for region-specific uncertainty. Andersson and Konrad (2003) argue that as the mobility of
the highly educated reduces governments’ scope for redistribution, it increases the private
incentives for education. Thus, tax coordination even among benevolent governments may
be undesirable, in line with what Kehoe (1989) concluded on taxing investments in physical
capital. All these contributions suggest that public policies, either in a closed economy or
with mobile labor, result in a risk of underinvestment in higher education.
This paper suggests that, in the presence of time-consistency problem, educating a larger
fraction of cohort than in a laissez-faire economy may be optimal. By encouraging tax
competition, globalization could undermine a social contract on subsidizing higher education.
Indeed, an increasing number of European countries have increased the share of the costs
of education that students must pay themselves, recently exemplified in the introduction of
top-up fees in England.
One way to introduce mobility in the framework of this paper is to assume that the
second period has three steps. In the first step, there is voting on taxes. In the second step,
those with university education learn what would be their net income abroad. Some of them
would have higher earning possibilities abroad, others at home. They then decide to stay or
migrate. In the third step, production takes place, taxes are collected and transfers are paid.
Migration would limit the incentives to tax high incomes, due to competition for the mobile
tax base. The expected lower level of income redistribution in the second period would
encourage choosing university education in the first period, reducing the need for subsidies.
Complementarities in Production and Corporatist Labor Market
This paper analyzed the case of linear production technology. Already Johnson (1984)
and Creedy and Francois (1990) suggested that complementarities or positive externalities
could motivate public subsidies to higher education. Likewise, if a corporatist labor mar-
ket means that those with higher education earn less than their marginal productivity, this
would be an additional motivation to subsidies. Galor and Moav (2006) even suggest that
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the demise of the capitalists—workers class structure resulted from the willingness of capital-
ists to support the provision of public education for the masses, in reaction to the increasing
importance of human capital in sustaining their profit rates. Remarkably, none of these sup-
plementary mechanisms was needed to derive the main results of this paper. Incorporating
them in the presence of time-consistency problem when voting on redistribution is left for
future research.
V. Conclusion
During the second half of the 20th century, income redistribution first increased dramat-
ically and then levelled off in Western countries. This coincided with a significant expansion
in the participation in higher education. In the 1980s and 1990s, the trend towards higher
marginal tax rates was reversed and several countries started to reduce especially top mar-
ginal tax rates. This paper suggests that the increased capacity to redistribute income may
have fuelled expansion in the higher education, due to time-consistency problem. The ex-
pansion of higher education, in turn, later helped to reduce income redistribution. The novel
mechanism that this paper identifies is the following. By providing so generous subsidies to
higher education that more than half of population chooses it, citizens give the median voter
incentives to choose lower taxes in the future. Such a strategic expansion of higher education
may be welcomed also by those who choose vocational education. It should be highlighted
that even though this paper showed that subsidies to higher education may generate a Pareto
improvement, the Pareto-improvement arises relative to income redistribution in the absence
of subsidies. As the model assumed no market failures to motivate public intervention in
the first place, the laissez-faire outcome is Pareto-efficient.
Towards the end of the 20th century, most OECD countries further scaled back especially
top marginal tax rates, this time due to increased economic integration and mobility. By
alleviating time-consistency problem, tax competition also reduces the strategic motivation
to subsidize higher education that this paper highlighted. In Europe, the free mobility and
increasing international mobility that the Bologna process is aimed to boost further suggest
that while the 20th century saw an upward trend in both income redistribution and subsidies
to higher education, the 21st century may witness a reduction in the tax burden on the highly
educated and reallocation of the cost of financing higher education to students themselves.
Furthermore, such a change may be associated with a reduction in the fraction of population
obtaining higher education. A formal analysis of the dynamics associated with increased
mobility, as well as studying the effects of population aging and technological change, are
left for future research.
10
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.
By Lemma 2, (6) and (7), both University Equilibrium and Vocational Equilibrium are
subgame-perfect equilibria when s = v − hm + c. By the assumption that the University
Equilibrium is selected in case of multiple equilibria, ê = hm and τ̂ =
1
2δ
. The lump-sum
transfer in case of no subsidies is
bns =
1
4δ
∫ h
hi=v+
c
1−
1
2δ
f(h)(h− v)dh.
The lump-sum transfer with subsidies is
bs =
1
4δ
∫ h
hi=hm
f(h)(h− hm)dh− (v − h
m + c)(1− F (hm)).
The citizens with h < hm gain from providing subsidies if and only if b
s > bns. This is
equivalent to
1
4δ
∫ h
hi=hm
f(h)(h− hm)dh− (v − h
m + c)(1− F (hm)) >
1
4δ
∫ h
hi=v+
c
1−
1
2δ
f(h)(h− v)dh.
Rearranging and combining the terms gives (8).
Finally, notice that it is not optimal for those who choose vocational education to support
any higher subsidies. If they would do so, those with h < hm who switch to university
education would, in any case, avoid paying taxes as ê = hm.
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